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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15351 
DAVID EDWARD ALBO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Unlawful Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance for Value in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (a) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable James s. Sawaya, presiding. On June 17, 1977, 
appellant was found guilty of the offense charged and 
sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State 
Prison of zero to ten years. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an aff irmance of the verdict 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January, 1977, Detective Tom Carlson of 
the Bountiful Police Department met Kayle Shaw, a former 
drug user, who was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. Shaw informed Carlson that he wanted to be an 
undercover narcotics agent (T.17,256). After his release 
from jail, Shaw had given the narcotics agents a list of 
approximately fourteen names of persons he had bought drugs 
from and whom he would help prosecute through controlled 
narcotics purchases (T .128). During the months of February, 
March and April, Shaw, known undercover as Mike Days, made 
controlled buys from nine different persons (T.261). 
One such controlled buy was arranged on April 20, l~ 
when Shaw and co-defendant Gayle Boone agreed that Shaw would P~ 
the $1,000 price quote~ by appellant for an ounce of THC 
(T.27,29) (THC is the street name for tetrahydrocanibol, 
the active ingredient in marijuana). 
On April 27, 1977, at about 5:00 p.m., Shaw called 
Boone at The Gym, 2827 South 3200 East, an exercise 
-2-
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establishment frequented by Boone (T.346,350), and asked 
if he had the THC (T.25). Boone responded that ne 
had it and told Shaw to come to The Gym to get it (T.25). 
Shaw then telephoned Tom Carlson at the 
office of the State Narcotics Law Enforcement Division at 
the Utah State Fairgrounds and told him the delivery was 
set (T.26). On arrival at the Fairgrounds office, Shaw was 
strip-searched, provided with $1,000 in bills which had been 
xeroxed and whose numbers had been separately listed, wired 
with a hidden, electronic transmitter and given a code 
phrase to use to report that the buy had been made; all 
standard procedures for undercover narcotics purchases (T.26, 
173,175). Detective Carlson also searched ~haw's car and 
found no narcotics secreted there (T.173). At approximately 
5:45 p.m. Shaw drove directly to The Gym, with six cars and 
twelve agents following close behind (T.30,174). On arrival 
at The Gym, Boone told Shaw to take a break because "his 
man" had not arrived yet (T.35). Shaw drove to the 7-11 Store 
at 3300 South 2300 East, followed by Agent Allred and Detective 
Carlson (T.36,180). Once again Shaw was patted down before 
returning to the exercise club (T.26,180), where Boone 
remarked that his delivery man would be driving a white 
Continental. A white Continental Mark IV arrived at 7:15; 
Shaw went inside the building {T.47). A few minutes later 
-3-
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Ronne entered the cluh and qave Shaw a plastic baq 
which contained a brown powder (proven to be PCP 
[phencyclidine, an animal tranquilizer]) (T.308), after 
Shaw had counted out and given appellant (identified by 
Shaw atT.28) $1,000 (T.51). Shaw transmitted the pre-
arranged signal to show that the buy had been made (T.52), 
and Boone and Shaw left the building. Boone got 
into the passenger side of the white Continental driven 
by a man identified by Agent Allred as appellant 
David Albo (T.187). Narcotics agents swarmed 
over the scene, appellant and Boone were arrested, Agent 
Fullmer recovered from appellant $980.00 of the Money supplied 
to Shaw, and Shaw was placed under mock arrest (T.53,188,192, 
288). Agent Moore and Shaw initialed the baggie containing 
the PCP, sealed it in a yellow packet, and Moore stored it in 
the evidence locker until it was dispatched to Bruce Beck for 
a toxicological analysis (T.296,300-301). 
Appellant testified in his defense that Boone 
called him that evening and told him that he could now pay 
him money that Boone had borrowed from appellant in September, 
1976 (T.407). Appellant claimed he drove to The Gym and 
Boone came to his car with a thousand dollars, saying that 
his "man" had finally paid him (T.412). As Boone began 
counting out the money for appellant, the police officers 
appeared, arrested the men, and seized the money which 
appellant had placed in his pocket (T.413-414). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER RULE 6 3 ( 9) OF THE UTJl.H RULES OF EVIDENCE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY 
OF KAYLE SHAW AND THE TAPE RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION 
BETWEEN SHAW AND CO-DEFENDANT GAYLE BOONE. 
During the trial, narcotics agent Kayle Shaw was 
allowed to testify about a conversation he had with Gayle 
Boone, in which Boone made a number of statements that in-
criminated appellant. A tape recording of that conversation 
was also admitted. When appellant objected to admission of 
the evidence against him, claiming it was barred as hearsay, 
the court admonished the jury that at that time the evidence 
was admissible only against co-defendant Boone (T.22). 
Subsequently independent evidence was admitted 
which established against Boone and appellant a prima facia 
case of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. 
That evidence consisted of the arrival of appellant at the 
location of the drug sale (T.47), the approach of Boone, 
empty-handed to appellant's car, the return to the gym of 
Gayle Boone, clutching a plastic bag containing a brown sub-
stance, later proven to be PCP (T.308), and the subsequent 
entry of Boone into appellant's car where police interrupted 
him counting out several hundred dollars to appellant, who 
-5-
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put the money in his pocket as police officers ordered him 
from the vehicle (T.187,192). This substantial amount of 
independent evidence provided the basis for a finding by 
the jury that beyond a reasonable doubt a conspiracy to dis-
tribute a controled substance existed between appellant and 
Boone. Once that conspiracy was established, the jury could 
use under Rule 63(9) 1 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and current 
case law (see ~) Boone's incriminating statements made 
in furtherance of the conspiracy against appellant as evidence 
to determine appellant's guilt on the underlying substantive 
charge of distribution of a controlled substance for value. 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941), 
requires that a conspiracy be proved by independent acts. 
The statement of a person that he is the agent of another 
will not suffice. Respondent submits that in the instant ca~ 
these requirements were met and that the trial court properly 
l RULE 63. HEARSAY EVIDENCE EXCLUDED--EXCEPTIONS 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a 
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove 
the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and 
inadmissible except: 
(9) Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a 
statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant 
at the hearing if (a) the judge finds the declarant is un-
available as a witness and that the statement concerned a 
matter within the scope of an agency or employment of the 
declarant for the party and was made before the terminatior. 
of such relationship, or (b) the party and the declarant 
were participating in a plan to commit a crime or a civil 
wrong and the statement was relevant to the plan or its 
subject matter and was1 litlade while the plan was in existence 
and before its complete execution or other termination, or 
(c) one of the issues between the party and the proponent 
of the evidence of the statement is a legal liability of 
the declarant, and the statement tends to establish that 
liability~ 
-6-
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submitted the evidence to the jury. Appellant complains 
that the trial court made no preliminary determination on 
the admissibility of the co-conspirator's testimony, although 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 2 and Carbo v. United 
states, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963) require that the court 
preliminarily decide if a prima facie case of conspiracy 
has been made and submit the evidence to the jury only after 
so finding. 
In the case at bar appellant never asked the court 
for a specific finding on the conspiracy issue3 Although the 
2 
3 
RULE 8. PRELIMINARY INQUIRY BY JUDGE 
When the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the 
~dmissibil~ty of evidence, or the 7xistence of a privilege 
is stated in these rules to be subJect to a condition, and 
the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, the issue is 
to be determined by the judge, and he shall indicate to the 
parties which one has the burden of producing evidence and 
the burden of proof on such issue as implied by the rule 
under which the question arises. The judge may hear and 
determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of 
the jury, except that on the admissibility of a confession 
the judge, if requested, shall hear and determine the ques-
tion out of the presence and hearing of the jury. But this 
rule shall not be construed to limit the right of a party 
to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight 
or credibility. 
Respondent has observed that appellant filed no objection 
to any jury instruction until after the jury had returned 
its verdict and the day of sentencing had arrived (T.490, 
5.2). Objections to jury instructions must be made before 
the instructions are given to the jury. As this court said 
in State v. Cowan 26 U.2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971): 
"Rule 51 U.R.C.P. (applicable in criminal 
proceedings unless otherwise provided) requires 
that absent a contrary stipulation by the 
parties, all instructions given a jury must be 
in writing, and that objections to such written 
instructions must be made before the instruc-
tions are given to the jury." (Emphasis added) 
Although the trial court allowed appellant to timely make 
his objections at sentencing (S.2), the record does not 
indicate that the state ever stipulated to such procedural 
irregularity. 
-7-
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trial court made no specific oral finding, an analysis of 
the transcript shows conclusively that the court was mindful 
of the requirements of law and of its duty to look for a 
prima facie case of conspiracy before admitting the incriminat-
ing evidence. 
The trial proceedings included the following 
admonishment by the court after appellant had objected to 
the hearsay: 
"The record may show a continuing 
objection of the defendant Alba through 
Mr. Brown to the testimony of this wit-
ness relating a conversation had between 
himself and the defendant Boone and I 
would admonish the jury that that testi-
mony at least at this time should not 
be considered in your case or your 
deliberations as against the defendant 
Albo. " (T • 2 2) • 
This cautionary instruction indicates that the coort 
was alert to the requirements of Erwin, supra, and the giving 
of Jury Instruction No. 16 4 demonstrated that by the close of 
4 uuring the course of this trial the Court has received 
testimony and evidence of conversations between- the defendant 
Gayle Lee Boone and Kayle Shaw, Jr. , aka Mike Days with the 
admonition from the Court that such testimony is not to be 
considered as evidence against the co-defendant David Edward 
Albo. Under the rules of evidence of the State of Utah, such 
testimony and evidence is hearsay unless there has been 
evidence presented which proves to your satisfaction, al":J 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the declarant, Gayle Lee ~oonei 
and the co-defendant, David Edward Albo, were participating 
in a plan to commit a crime and the statement was relevant 
to the plan or its subject matter and was made while the plan 
was in existence and before its complete execution or other 
termination. If you so find, you may consider any and all 
statements made by the defendant Boone to Kayle Shaw aka . 
Mike Days as substantive evidence against the defendant l-1"" 
(R. 8 5) • 
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trial the court had been satisfied that if the state's 
evidence were believed a prima facie case of conspiracy had 
been established and that the jury would be entrusted with 
the evidence to make their independent determination of 
whether a conspiracy had been established beyond a reasonable 
~, based on evidence other than Kayle Shaw's testimony 
and the tape recording. Only if the jury so found could 
statements made by co-defendant Boone to Shaw be considered 
as substantive evidence against appellant. 
Although the question of conditional admissibility 
is for the trial judge to determine, there is no error in 
conditionally admitting the statements before a prima facie 
case was established by independent evidence if subsequently 
such a case is proven, because the trial judge has wide dis-
cretion over the order of proof. In South-East Coal Co. v, 
Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970), Con-
solidation objected to the admission of hearsay statements 
until a prima facie conspiracy case had been proven. The 
Court of Appeals found that ?t the close of the plaintiff's 
case there had been established by independent or disassociated 
evidence a prirna facie case and that, therefore, the require-
ment for having conditionally admitted the statements was met. 
Respondent submits that the trial court accurately 
interpreted the requirements, Rule 63(9), of Erwin and Carbo, 
-9-
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~· the latter also observing: 
"It is well-established that the 
declarations of one conspirator in 
furtherance of the objects of the 
conspiracy, made to a third party, 
are admissible against his co-
conspirators." At 735) 
Since the statements of co-defendant Boone concerning the 
expected arrival of his drug delivery man were made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, the evidence was fully admissibl 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 
476 (1968), is relied upon by appellant to demonstrate that 
the challenged evidence was improperly admitted. Bruton 
concerned a confession of co-defendant Evans to a postal 
inspector, who testified that Evans admitted to him that he 
and Bruton had committed armed postal robbery. Evans did not 
testify and his conviction was reversed on appeal because the 
confession had been involuntary. The United States Supreme 
Court reversed Bruton' s conviction, holding that the introduc·: 
tion of Evans' confession violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment 
right of cross-examination, and that the limiting instruction 
of the court cautioning the jury that the confession was 
competent evidence only against Evans was insufficient to remo~ 
any prejudice to Bruton. 
"A jury cannot 'segregate evidence 
into intellectual boxes' ... It cannot 
determine that a confession is true insofar 
as it admits that A has committed criminal 
acts with B and at the same time effectively 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ignore the inevitable conclusion that B 
has committed those same criminal acts 
with A." 20 L.Ed.2d at 482, quoting 
Justice Traynor in People v. Aranda, 63 
Cal.2d 518, 528-529, 407 P.2d 265, 271-
272. 
The case at bar does not concern a confession and 
Bruton is, therefore, inapplicable. However, the United States 
Supreme Court did consider a matter similar to the present 
case in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), 
where the trial court had admitted the testimony of a prosecu-
tion witness that an alleged accomplice of the defendant had 
told the witness, who was a fellow prisoner, that if it had 
not been for the defendant, "we wouldn't be in this now." 
The alleged accomplice did not testify at trial. The Court 
reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which had found 
Georgia's hearsay exception too broad and remanded the case 
to the Circuit Court for consideration of other issues. In 
its plurality opinion, the Court listed several factors which 
it had considered in finding that defendant Evans was not 
denied his right of confrontation. 
" ... Third, the possibility that 
Williams' statement was founded on 
faulty recollection is remote in the 
extreme. Fourth, the circumstances under 
under which Williams made the statement 
were such as to give reason to suppose 
that Williams did not misrepresent Evans' 
involvement in the crime. These reasons 
go beyond a showing that Williams had no 
-11-
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apparent reason to lie to Shaw. His 
statement was spontaneous, and it was 
against his penal interest to make it. 
These are indicia of realiability which 
have been widely viewed as determinative 
of whether a statement may be placed 
before the jury though there is no con-
frontation of the declarant." (Emphasis 
added. ) 27 L.Ed.2d at 227 
These observations are highly relevant in the 
instant case where the tape recording of Boone's spontaneous 
comments, made in anticipation of the drug transaction and 
against Boone's penal interest, insure high reliability and 
give additional support for Shaw's recollection of the con-
versation. (The reliability is further enhanced by Boone's 
ignorance of Shaw's status as undercover narcotics agent for 
the probability is that had he known that Shaw was a 
monitered agent, he would have made no statements which 
incriminated either himself or appellant.) Once the con-
spiracy was established, the jury was clearly entitled to 
consider this relevant, reliable evidence. 
Jackson v. Dunno, 37 U.S. 368, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 
(1964), also relied upon by appellant, is inapplicable to 
the case at bar. Jackson concerns the prejudice which arises 
when a jury determines both the voluntariness and the truth-
fulness of a defendant's confession. This court is not faced 
with a confession and the special procedural safeguards whi~ 
have attached to confessions have never been extended to the 
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admissions of co-conspirators. The constitutional protections 
afforded a person who is beaten until he confesses to a 
crime are significantly greater than those of a co-conspirator 
who makes incriminating statements while pursing the criminal 
objective of the conspiracy, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), Dutton v. Evans, supra, and California v. Gre·en,- infra. 
In Point II of his brief, appellant attempts to 
use Jackson, supra, and Bruton, supra, to support his claim 
of denial of the right of confrontation. However, he has 
neglected an important footnote in Bruton. Footnote 3 at 
20 L.Ed. 481 states: 
"There is not before us, therefore, 
any recognized exception to the hearsay 
rule insofar as petitioner is concerned 
and we intimate no view whatever that 
such exceptions necessarily raise 
questions under the Confrontation Clause." 
The focal point of the instant case is the validity of evidence 
offered under the well-recognized hearsay exception of a co-
conspirator's admissions made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Respondent asserts that under current law no confrontation 
problem arises. Appellant correctly reports that the Con-
frontation Clause has been made obligatory on the states by 
the Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. But 
as the Court in Dutton, supra, added: " ••• that is no more 
than the beginning of our inquiry." 27 L.Ed.2d at 221. 
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"It is not argued, nor could it 
be that the constitutional right to 
confrontation requires that no hearsay 
evidence can ever be introduced. In 
the Pointer case itself, we referred 
to the decisions of this Court that 
have approved the admission of hearsay." 
Id. at 222. 
After remarking that such hearsay as dy.u.J -"P,..larations and 
testimony of a deceased witness at a former trial are 
admissible, the Court considered the Georgia statute at 
issue. Ga. Code Ann. § 38-306 (1954) provides: 
"After the fact of conspiracy shall 
be proved, the declarations by any one 
of the conspirators during the pendancy 
of the criminal project shall be admis-
sible against all." 
State courts had interpreted this statute to allow hearsay 
testimony of statements made by the defendants during the 
concealment phase of the conspiracy. 
The Dutton court acknowledged that federal courts 
have declined to extend the hearsay exception to include out-
of-court statements made during the concealment phase but 
held the Georgia statute and interpretation constitutional 
despite petitioner's claim of lack of confrontation. 
"While it may readily be conceded 
that hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause are generally designed to protect 
similar values, it is quite a different 
thing to suggest that the overlap is 
complete and that the Confrontation Clause 
is nothing more or less than a codification 
of the rules of hearsay and their excep-
tions as they existed historically at 
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common law. Our decisions have never 
established such a congruence .•• " Id. 
at 223. 
In Dutton, petitioner Evans exercised his right 
to confrontation on the factual question of whether Shaw 
had actually heard Williams make the statement Shaw related; 
and the court commented that the several indicia of reliability 
made "the possibility that cross-examination of Williams 
could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, 
though made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal." 
Id. at 227. 
Respondent submits that on this point Dutton is 
analogous to the instant case because the corroborating tape 
recording and independent verifying acts made it wholly 
unlikely that any cross-examination of Boone could have shown 
that his own statements, though made to Shaw, were unreliable. 
The court in Dutton ultimately declared that 
"decisions of this court make it 
clear that the mission of the Con-
frontation Clause is to advance a 
practical concern for the accuracy 
of the truth-determining process in 
criminal trials by assuring that 
'the trier of fact [has] a satis-
factory basis for evaluating the 
truth of the prior statement.' 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
161, 26 L.Ed.2d t\89, 498 (1970) ." 
27 L.Ed.2d at 227. 
Respondent asserts that the admission of evidence 
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against appellant in this case accomplishes "the mission 
of the Confrontation Clause." The facts of the present case 
distinguish it from Bruton, supra, and Pointer v. Texas, 380 
1 
U.S. 400, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), (trial court allowed I 
testimony from a preliminary hearing witness though defendant\ 
was not then represented by counsel and had not cross-examinecl 
I 
the witness), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 13 L.Ed.ld 
934 (1965), (trial court permitted prosecution to read a 
document purporting to be accomplice's confession after 
accomplice had refused to testify in reliance upon his 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination) • In con-
junction with the inherent reliability of the evidence, 
appellant's inability to cross-examine co-defendant Boone, 
who had exercised his right not to testify, posed no con-
frontation problem and under the rationale of Dutton v. Evans, 
supra, and California v. Green, supra, the hearsay evidence wa>i 
fairly admitted under the co-conspirator exception. 
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-POINT II 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE HAVING BEEN 
CLAIMED FOR VALID REASONS BY BRADLEY RICH, THE TRIAL 
COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE THE 
ATTORNEY TO TESTIFY. 
For a period of two months in 1977, Bradley 
Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association repre-
sented Kayle Shaw, who was facing three charges of 
aggravated robbery (T.20,74). With the jury absent, 
counsel for co-defendant Boone called Mr. Rich to 
testify and after several preliminary questions asked 
the witness if he ever had occasion to discu7s Shaw's 
work as an undercover agent for the State of Utah. Mr. 
Bj~~ ~efused to answer the question on the ground that 
a response would require him to divulge a confidence of a 
client (T.357). The attorney's refusal was in complete 
accord with Rule 26(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which provides: 
"Subject to Rule 37 and except 
as otherwise provided by paragraph 2 
of this rule communications found by 
the judge to have been between lawyer 
and his client in the course of that 
relationship and in professional 
confidence, are privileged, and a 
client has a privilege (a) if he is 
the witness to refuse to disclose 
any such communication, and (b) to 
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• 
prevent his lawyer from disclosing 
it, and (c) to prevent any other 
witness froM disclosing such 
communication if it came to the 
knowledge of such witness (i) in 
the course of its transmittal 
between the client and the lawyer, 
or (ii) in a manner not reasonably 
to be anticipated by the client, 
or (iii) as a result of a breach 
of the lawyer-client relationship. 
The privilege may be claiMed by the 
client in person or by his lawyer, 
or if incompetent, by his guardian, 
or if deceased by his personal 
representative. The privilege 
available to a corporation or 
association terminates upon 
dissolution." 
The exceptions to this general rule are detailed 
in 26 (2) and it is specifically upon 26 (2) ·ca) that appellant 
bases his allegation that the privilege was improperly 
claimed by Mr. Rich and sustained by the court. Rule 
26 ( :?) (a) states: 
. "Such privileges shall not 
extend (a) to a communication if the 
judge finds that sufficient evidence, 
aside from the communication, has been 
introduced to warrant a finding that 
the legal service was sought or obtained 
in order to enable or aid the client to 
commit or plan to commit a crime or 
tort." 
The record shows that Mr. Rich was hired .to repre-
sent Shaw on robbery charges and his January 10th appointment 
occurred weeks before Shaw made overtures to Detective 
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Carlson about the possibility of becoming an agent. There 
is no evidence to suggest that Shaw hired Mr. Rich to aid 
him in the commission of a crime, and therefore no excep-
zion under 26(2) (a) exists, and the witness properly 
invoked the attorney-client privilege on behalf of Kayle 
Shaw. 
Counsel urged the court to require Mr. Rich 
to respond in camera, stating that the judge could then 
determine for himself whether the communication was 
privileged (T.360). The court refused and deferred to 
Mr. Rich's judgment and knowlege of the facts allowing 
him to claim the privilege if he determined that answering 
would violate a confidence (T.363). 
No Utah case supports appellant's claim. ~­
District Court of Second Judicial District, 550 P.2d 315 
(Colo. 1976), is distingu_ishable. It concerned the 
work product exception in a grand jury proceeding. 
People v. M~han, 1 Utah 205 (1875), is also inapplicable 
as that defendant had consulted with the attorney for 
the .§_Ole purpose of learning the legal effect of signing 
another's name to a note. Noteworthy here is the excerpt 
cited by appellant, in which Lord Chief Baron is quoted 
as having said: 
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"Where the original ground 
of communication is malum in se 
• • • this can never be included 
within ••• professional 
confidence." {Emphasis added.) 
Once again ·the focus is on the motive for seeking legal 
help, and Kayle Shaw's retention of counsel to represent 
him in felony trials is a legitimate motive. 
Finally, the Kansas case, State v. Henderson, 
205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 {1970), is also distinguishable 
as the defendant was the attorney's client, and the attorney 
spoke up in an attempt to withdraw as counsel because his 
client was uncooperative and insisted on giving perjured 
testimony. It must be noted, however, that the duty owed 
to the court by a defendant's attorney is intrinsically 
different from the duty owed by the former attorney of a 
witness. That the former may have a higher obligation to 
keep perjured testimony from being given is no evidence 
that the latter has the same responsibility. 
Rule 26 allows an attorney to claim the privilege 
on behalf of his client and makes no provision for a 
setiarate determination by the court that the matter actually 
is privileged. The trial court,· therefore, properly allowed 
Mr. Rich to claim the privilege and refused to testify 
about confidences shared during his professional relation-
ship with Kayle Shaw. 
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POINT III 
THE GRANTING OF A CONTINUANCE RESTS IN THE 
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in not granting a continuance over a weekend so 
that Carolyn Nichols, Kayle Shaw's former attorney, 
could testify. Appellant wanted to question Ms. Nichols 
about Shaw's statement that she and Boone were 
planning to have Shaw murdered. After considerable 
argument (T.400-404), the court made the following ruling 
in denying appellant's request: 
"THE COURT: I can't see that 
that testimony or that evidence is 
that damaging or prejudicial to the 
defendant, frankly. We spent 
considerable time on collateral 
matters that didn't even bear on the 
main issue of this trial and it seems 
to me that that was one of them. I 
don't feel that the Jurors are going 
to give any attention to that particular 
part of the testimony. They will see if 
[sic] for what it was and that was just 
simply a conclusion or a statement of 
the witness and I think he was more or 
less pressured into saying something 
on the stand and that just happened to 
be it. I don't feel that--if your 
witness was available I would consent 
to certainly let you reopen for the 
purpose of putting her on the stand 
and attempting to elicit her testimony 
but I just feel in the interest of --
in the interest of time and for an 
orderly trial we should proceed until 
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conclusion. I don't think we can 
finish today. In fact, we have 
discussed it so long now that I 
am sure that we can't. I would 
deny the motion to continue it 
until Monday which is past the 
weekend and we will proceed in the 
morning." (T.403-404). 
State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 {Utah 1975), 
announced the standard of review in determining if the 
refusal to grant a continuance was prejudicial error: 
"The granting of a continuance 
of a case is a matter resting in the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, 
and that discretion will not be 
interfered with on appeal except 
where the court clearly abused its 
discretion in the matter." 
It is clear from the trial judge's statement that 
he found that whole area of testimony for which the continuanc1 
was sought to be collateral to the main issue, in no way 
damaging or prejudicial to appellant, and time consuming 
and inconvenient to the court. These findings rebut 
appellant's claim that the testimony would have been material, 
likely to have affected the jury's verdict, and of little 
inconvenience to the court, three factors which he cites 
as necessary under a 1976 Alaska decision, Saluz;:n v. St:Jtc,) 
P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976).. In that case the appellant, convicted 
of murder, was granted a new trial because the court found 
that the expected testimony of an absent police officers 
that he could see the victim's car from the road would be 
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material to appellant's defense, where the state's theory 
of the case was that the deceased's car could not be seen 
from the road and appellant knew it was there only because 
he had conunitted the killing. 
The crucial nature of the denied testimony, so 
clearly apparent in Salazar, is not present in the instant 
case. Here, the trial judge reasonably concluded that the 
jurors would not take seriously Shaw's allegations of a 
death plot. 
The trial court made reasonable, proper findings 
in his refusal to deny a weekend continuance pursuant to 
his authority under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which allows the exclusion of admissible evidence, and 
therefore did not abuse his discretion. Respondent urges 
the court to reject appellant's claim. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED INTO EVIDEUCE 
THE UNDERCOVER AGENT'S FULL VERSION OF THE EVENTS \'l!IICH 
OCCURRED DURING THE PROTRACTED NARCOTICS TRANSACTION; SUSTAIN· 
ING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS AND THE GIVING OF APPROPRIATE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS CURED OTHER IMPERFECTIONS. 
During the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, he 
was questioned about the conversation that he had with Boone 
while the two men awaited the delivery of the drugs. Shaw 
testified that Boone told him that "he still has an ounce 
of An9el Dust down in his crib [apartment] . " (T. 39) Appellant 
then moved for a mistrial and the trial court denied the 
motion, stating that while it was a close question as to 
whether this conversation was part of the crime~ appellant 
had not been prejudiced enough for a mistrial (T.43-46). 
Later Shaw made the statement that he doubted if he 
would still be alive if Boone had known that Shaw was an 
informo.nt. An objection to the sta.te1:ient '.:as fT:a.de .:Ji1d sustJ::1 
the remark stricken, and the jury admonished to disregard the 
answer of the witness (T.140). 
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The final complaint concerning Kayle Shaw's testi-
mony is that he said that he had fired his attorney because 
he believed that she was conspiring with Boone 'to "set 
him up [for assassina~ion) ." (T.142). Appellant's motion 
for a mistrial was denied and the trial judge said that he 
didn't think the appellant had been prejudiced and that it was 
highly unlikely that the jury's verdict would be based on 
this one statei:ient (T.146). Shaw admitted on csross-examination 
that co-defendant Boone had never threatened him (T.153). 
Utah case law provides the proper standard for 
determining when a motion for-a mistrial should be granted. 
The standard is established in several recent cases, among 
them State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P. 2d 1323 (1974), and 
State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972). In each 
case unanimous courts affirmed the decisions of the lower courts 
to deny motions for mistrial. This Court noted that a mistrial 
should be granted if the trial judge believes that an error has 
been made and that "in light of the total proceeding there has 
been such prejudice that the defendant cannot have a fair and 
impartial determination of his guilt or innocence." 517 P.2d 
at 1324. 
On review this Court considers these two propositions 
and should reverse only if it appears that(!) error did occur 
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and(2) substantial prejudice resulted to the extent that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error, 
there would have been a different result. 502 P.2d at 114. 
In reviewing the facts this Court acknowledges the authori~ 
and advantaged position of the trial judge and will not upset 
his ruling. unless it clearly appears that he had abused his 
discretion. 517 P.2d at 1324 and 502 P.2d at 114. 
Respondent submits that on review of the record 
and in light of analysis below, this court will find that the 
trial court carefully and thoughtfully made his rulings and 
he did not abuse his discretion. 
The trial court did not actually determine if the 
first alleged error was in fact error, rather calling it a 
close question, and finding that even if it were error, theu 
had not been enough prejudice to warrant a mistrial. Impliill 
in this finding is the determination that the verdict of the 
jury does not hinge on Shaw's reference to Boone's possession 
of Angel Dust. Respondent further submits that under Rule 550 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the inclusion within Shaw's tesfr 
mony of appellant's statement that he was in possession of 
Angle Dust was proper. Hhile not admissible as proof of guilt 
of the crime charged, it is admissible as tendiny to showin:,n 
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:n 
f . 5 plan and lack o mistake. 
Additional support for admission of the statement 
comes from State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977). In 
reversing a lower court conviction on other grounds, the 
majority rebuffed appellant's claim that testimony was admitted 
in violation of Rule 55: 
"The testimony concerning the other 
allegedly criminal acts [the robbery of 
other persons) committed by the defendant 
during the course of the commission of 
the crime with which he was charged, 
were, in fact, eyewitness descriptions 
of the events that occurred." 571 P.2d 
at 1353. 
On this basis a narration of the conversation between Boone 
and Shaw as they awaited delivery of the PCP was proper, even 
if it included a minor reference to other drugs to. be sold, 
such a reference not being sufficiently prejudicial to require 
exclusion from Shaw's chronological account of the events at 
the meeting. 
Regarding the second incident, the sustaining of the 
objection to the improper response and the cautionary admoni-
tion to the jury cured any potential prejudice: As the Hodges 
5
RULE 55, OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL WRONGS. Subject to Rule 47 
evidence that a person committed a crime or civil ~rong on a 
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition 
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact 
inclmling absence of mistake or· accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
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court remarked: 
"In the absence of something 
persuasive to the contrary, we assume 
that the jurors were conscientious in 
performing to [sic] their duty, and 
that they followed the instructions 
of the court." 517 P.2d at 1324. 
Respondent submits that because no evidence was offered to 
support the claim of prejudice and in deference to the trial 
court's authority, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
In reference to the third allegation, that a mistriil 
should have been declared after Shaw's remark about his previou 
attorney, respondent urges the Court to sustain the action of 
the trial court in denying the motion. Having found no 
prejudice, the trial judge could not grant a mistrial. The 
credibility of a witness is for the jury to determine, and it 
is unlikely that jurors would have seriously considered Shaw's 
claim that his former attorney, a member in good standing of 
the Utah Bar, had been involved in an assassination plot. 
The trial judge stated that he did not believe that the 
testimony was damaging or prejudicial to appellant, the issue 
was a collateral one with no bearing on the main issue of 
appellant's guilt in distributing a controlled subsLance fo~ 
value, and he did not believe the jurors would give it anothe: 
thought (T.403-404). Given this inherent incredibility of 
-28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the testimony, there was little likelihood that Shaw's remark 
would have substantial impact on the jury, as to alter the 
verdict, and the motion for mistrial was properly denied. 
POINT V 
THE ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT WAS ACTUALLY PROPER REBUTTAL IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
TOTAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant made no objections to statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and the general rule is that 
a failure to raise objections at trial precludes the considera-
tion of those issues on appeal unless such exceptional circum-
stances exist that a miscarriage of justice would result if 
the matter were not considered. State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 
118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971). Appellant cites a California case, 
People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 324 P.2d 556 (1958), as provid-
ing the exceptions relied upon. Namely, (1) grave doubts 
about ~efendant's guilt and(2) the inability to obviate or 
cure the alleged error. Respondent contends that evidence 
in the instant case was not evenly divided, so as to make 
the issue of appellant's guilt a close question. Appellant's 
only evidence was his own testimony that Boone was simply 
repaying an old debt although the state had earlier produced 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. Respondent also submits that 
even if error occurred during the argument stage, it was minor, 
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and the trial judge was fully equipped to obviate any potent[,) 
prejudice with appropriate admonishments and further cautionary 
instructions. 
Counsel for co-defendant Boone included in his closin 
argument a statement (partially Jury Instruction No. 10) wh~ 
informed the jury of Boone's constitutional right not 
to testify and that no presumption of guilt should arise fioo 
the exercise of that privilege. He noted that a defendantrnij 
have several reasons for not testifying - among them his 
satisfaction with the evidence presented or his reluctance 
to be cross-examined (T.458). 
During his argument the prosecutor alluded to 
defense counsel's comments: 
"He read the instruction about the 
defendant not testifying and not creat-
ing a presumption against him and he 
said the reason why the defendant did 
not testify--he said I am a skilled 
prosecutor and I would have had a 
chance to cross~examine him. No question 
about that. I would suggest that maybe 
that is the reason." (T. 4 83) 
Mr. Yocum then observed that Kayle Shaw was cross-
examined for two and one-half hours by two very skilled 
attorneys, yet cane through it very successfully, while 
edging that Shaw had admitted possessing LSD on occasion. 
Respondent contends that the prosecutor's remarks 
were wholly proper. They were in harmony v1i th the argument 
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guidelines of State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975),and 
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977),and State v. White, 
(Utah Case No. 15210, filed 3/13/78),and in accord with the 
constitutional mandate that the prosecution must not comment 
on the failure of the defendant to testify. See Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609,14 L.Ed 2d 106 (1965). 
In State v. Kazda, supra, the prosecutor had stated 
during closing argument, "The defense· has presented no evidence 
as to why the defendant was out there. What was he doing out 
there?" As in the instant case, Kazda neither testified nor 
called witnesses. After noting that trial counsel have both 
a right and a duty to analyze all aspects of the evidence, 
including what it is or isn't and what it shows and doesn't 
show, the court found the prosecutor's comment to be proper. 
In State v. Eaton, supra, we find an overzealous 
prosecutor who crossed the line between commenting on the total 
evidence and commenting specifically on the defendant's failure 
to testify. That case also involved a controlled drug buy and 
during closing argument the prosecutor stressed the fact that 
only the state's chief witness and the defendant "really knows 
[sic] •.-1hat took place in that house" and then asked "What does 
the defendant tell us?" Later he referred again t_o the defen-
dant's failure to testify and explain. The defendant in ~aton 
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received a new trial. 
The facts of Eaton are not similar to the instant 
case. Here the prosecutor• s emphasis was not on Boone's 
failure to testify, where he merely supported defense 
counsel's comments, rather it was on the thoroughness and 
consistency of Kayle Shaw's testimony. 
The most recent Utah case on this issue, State v. 
White, supra, makes clear that in appropriate circumstances 
the prosecutor may make an observation on a defendant's 
silence, as long as the purpose is not to encourage the 
jury to draw inferences of guilt from what was not said, 
but to see the total picture of the evidence. In White, also 
a drug case, the defendant was asked on direct examination 
only his name, address, and occupation. During closing 
argument the prosecutor said that because the scope of cross-
examination is limited by the direct examination, he could 
not ask the defendant about how he came to be in possession 
of heroin and cocaine' how much he was being paid for it, etc. 
In affirming the conviction, the Court found the remarks 
a proper part of the prosecutor's analysis of the evidence 
and that the prosecutor merely pointed out what the jury 
already knew--that the defendant hqd purposely limited his 
testimony to avoid saying anything about his involvement 
or non-involvement. 
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When compared with these three fact patterns, 
it is abundantly clear that the prosecutor's remarks 
in this case were proper and completely within the 
guidelines of constitutionally permissible evidence 
analysis. Even if this Court finds them to be error, 
they would be harmless under Hodges, supra, and Mitchell, 
supra, especially as the comments applied only to Boone, 
appellant having testified in his own behalf. 
Appellant also alleges that the trial court 
committed further error by allowing Mr. Yocum to read 
from a transcript of the tape recording when the transcript 
had earlier been refused admission into evidence. However, 
the prosecutor had personally listened to the tape, which 
had been admitted into evidence, and in refreshing his 
memory of what was on the tape, he is allowed to use any 
writing to jog his memory. McCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed., 
1973, Chap. 1, § 9, p. 15. The transcript accurately 
represented what he heard and he was therefore properly 
using the transcript for memory refreshing only and so stated 
at T. 487. The judge's actual ruling is unclear; he initially 
found Mr. Yocum's use of the transcript objectionable, but 
after the prosecutor argued present recollection refreshed, 
the judge agreed that Mr. Yocum could refer to what was 
on the tape· (T.487). Moreover, a prosecutor's closing 
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argument is not evidence and the jury in this case was so 
advised (T.434). 
Respondent rejects appellant's contention that 
the jurors probably drew the inference that the transcript 
of the tape which was available, probative evidence, had 
been kept from them by the court. The jury heard the 
tape during their deliberations and decided for themselves 
what the voices were saying, cognizant that Agent Allred 
had also listened to it and typed a transcription (T.191). 
Jury Instruction No. 6 clearly charged the jury to consider 
only the evidence, both offered and admitted, and the 
presumption is that the jury did its duty and followed 
its instructions. 
Nevertheless, cases cited by appellant do not 
support his clairn. In People v. Gilmer, 110 Ill.App.2d 73, 
249 N.E.2d 129, 133 (1969), the court found the "determining 
factor was whether there was a reasonable possibility that 
improperly introduced evidence might have contributed to 
the conviction." Respondent contends that it is substantially 
unlikely that the refusal of the court to allO'.•l the jury to 
see a transcript that on~ narcotics officer had made of a 
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tape which the jurors would themselves listen to, combined 
with an earlier remark about the prosecutor's cross- · 
examination skills, affected the jury's verdict. Unless 
appellant can show that but for these occurrences, if 
deemed error, the jury would likely have returned a not 
guilty verdict, the conviction must stand. Since 
appellant has not met the burden of State v. Eaton, 
supra, respondent urges the Court to reject appellant's 
arguments, no substantial evidence having been 
offered to support an acquittal. 
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POINT VI 
AS NO SIGNIFICANT ERRORS OCCURRED IN THE CONDUCT 
OF THE TRIAL, THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL, CUMULATIVE EFFECT, 
Respondent submits that the trial court conducted 
a fair trial for appellant and has offered evidence and case 
law in previous sections which demonstrate that neither 
the prosecutor nor the court committed prejud.icial error. 
State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P. 2d 323 Oij 
I 
cited as support by appellant is not analogous to the instant 
case. Paul St. Clair had been convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death, and the court then, as now, scrupulously 
searched the record in death-penalty cases for significant 
error, whether raised on appeal or not. The errors complaineo 
of in that case were individually significant, though not 
prejudicial, and the court decided that significant errors 
can have a cumulative prejudicial effect. In the instant 
case there were no significant errors. 
Appellant has not shown that the outcome would 
have been different even if claimed errors had not occurred 
and his conviction should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT VII 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 76-9-401, 402 (SUPP. 1977), ALLOW WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC 
EAVESDROPPING WHERE THE TRANSMITTER IS ATTACHED TO A WILLING 
INFORMANT-PARTICIPANT. 
-36-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant argues that the plurality opinion of 
Justice White in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 28 
L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), is a misstatement and misanalysis of 
the law concerning privacy and electronic eavesdropping. 
He urges this Court to reject this Supreme Court inter-
pretation of case law and constitutional standards and asks 
this Court to hold that warrantless electronic monitoring 
of a volunteer participant in a controlled drug purchase 
violates the constitutional right of privacy and is 
unreasonable search and seizure of the conversation. 
Respondent submits that the White decision is correct and 
logical and represents the current law in the area of 
privacy and warrantless electronic searches. 
In White, a case very similar to the instant 
case, the trial court overruled appellant's objections to 
testimony by government agents regarding conversations 
between the accused and an informant which the agents 
overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio trans-
mitter concealed on the informant. The prosecution was 
unable to locate and produce the informant at trial. 
Relying on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, l~ L.Ed.2d 
576 (1967), which held inadmissible recordings of 
conversations made by government agents by means of a 
listening device attached to the outside of a public 
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telephone booth, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed White's conviction. On certiorari, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit decision. 
In an opinion joined by Burger.,Chief Justice, 
Stewart, Justice, and Blackmun, Justice, Mr. Justice 
Whiteconfronted the issue of: 
" • whether the Fourth 
Amendment bars from evidence the 
testimony of governmental agents 
who related certain conversations 
which had occurred between defendant 
White and a government informant, 
Harvey Jackson, and which the agents 
overheard by monitoring the frequency 
of a radio transmitter and concealed 
on his person." 28 L.Ed.2d at 456. 
(Mr. Justice Black concurred and quickly disposed of the 
Fourth Amendment claim, citing his dissent in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. at 591, wherein he stated that the framers 
of the Constitution had not intended to r.estrict or outlaw th: 
use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, with wiretapping 
merely a sophisticated form of eavesdropping.) 
The Court acknowledged that Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), overruled Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), and Gold;n0n, 
-1 
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), which 
held that an actual physical trespass or invasion was required 
before the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures arose, therefore exempting wiretapping 
and electronic eavesdropping which originated beyond the 
curtilage of a home. Katz, supra, held inadmissible 
recordings obtained from a listening device placed on the 
outside of a phone booth without defendant Katz's knowledge 
or consent, where the government agents had not obtained 
a search warrant, thereby violating the privacy on which 
Katz had justifiably relied. 
The White Court distinguished and limited Katz, 
noting that Katz did not involve the use of a government 
informant who reported the conversation content to the 
government. Nor did the Katz Court: 
" • indicate in any way that 
a defendant has a justifiable and 
constitutionally protected expectation 
that a person with whom he is conversing 
will not then or later reveal the conversa-
tion to police." 28 L.Ed.2d 457. 
Therefore, Katz with its warrant requirement is limited to 
those circumstances not involving a participating informant. 
Katz only applies to occasions in which the government seeks 
to surreptitiously monitor phone calls and/or conversations 
in private places. Consequently, Katz is inapplicable to the 
case at bar, for here the state's chief witness, who agreed 
to wear a concealed transmitter, was a volunteer undercover 
agent participating in the controlled drug buy with Boone. 
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Unlike Katz, in which the recordings were made for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal activity, the 
instant case included the use of a transmitter primarily 
to provide protection for Kayle Shaw, the undercover 
agent (T.171). Should a narcotics dealer learn that the 
intended purchaser is actually a narcotics agent, the 
agent's life is placed in serious immediate jeopardy; a 
transmitter allows supporting police officers to ~ove in 
quickly if the transmission reveals that the undercover 
agent is in trouble. 
Appellant alleges that Justice White misconstrued 
earlier cases on the informant eavesdropping or electronic 
monitoring topic,particularly Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 17 L.E.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); and Lopez v. United States, 
373 U.S. 427, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963). Although these pre-
Katz opinions arose in the trespass analysis era of the 
United States Supreme Court, United States v. White, supra, 
found all three cases to be unaffected by Katz. The Court 
in Hoffa, supra, announced in clear language that the Fourth 
Amendment offers no protection to a defendant who relies 
upon a colleague's trust, only to learn that the "trusted 
colleague" is a government agent who reports regularly to 
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the authorities. 
"Neither this Court nor anv 
member of it has ever expressed-the 
view that the Fourth Amendment 
protects a wrongdoer's misplaced 
belief that a person to whom he 
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing 
will not reveal it." 17 L.Ed.2d at 
382. 
Since no electronic monitoring occurred in Hoffa, the only 
question presented to the Hoffa court which has relevance 
to this case was the admissibility of the informant's 
testimony. Any attempt to determine from the opinion how 
the Court would have treated the admissibility of testimony 
of an electronically eavesdropping government agent if such a 
person had existed is unproductive speculation. 
Lewis v. United States, supra, concerned the admis-
sibility of narcotics purchased from the defendant at his 
home by an undercover federal narcotics agent. Appellant 
alleged that the deception violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights but the Court rejected the claim, stating: 
"Were we to hold the deceptions 
of the agent in this case constitu-
tionally prohibited, we would come 
near to a rule that the use of 
undercover agents in any manner is 
virtually unconstitutional per se. 
Such a rule would, for example, 
severely hamper the government in 
ferreting out those organized 
crininal activities that are 
characterized by covert dealings 
-41-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with victims who either cannot or 
do not protest. A prime example is 
provided by the narcotics traffic." 
17 L.Ed.2d at 316. 
While neither Hoffa nor Lewis involved electronic 
eavesdropping, they do support the general propositions 
that (1) the enforcement of narcotics laws requires stealth, 
covert operations, and the participation and cooperation of 
informants or undercover agents and (2) Fourth Amendment 
protections do not extend to defendants who knowingly violate 
the criminal laws and who seek acquittal solely because they 
shared incriminating information and/or engaged in criminal 
activity with a per son who was a covert government agent who 
subsequently testified against them. 
The third case cited by White in supporting its 
holding and more nearly on point to the instant case and 
to the White facts is Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 
10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963). In Lopez, the appellant was convicted 
of attempting to bribe an Internal Revenue Service agent, a~ 
the offer of the bribe had been secretly recorded by the 
agent during a meeting at Lopez's office. Appellant claimed 
that the recording should not have been admitted into 
evidence, but the Court rebuffed his challenge, observing 
that the recording device had not been planted during a 
trespass but had been carried in and out by an agent who 
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was there with petitioner's assent, and that the device 
neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself. The 
Court then focused on appellant's real complaint: 
"Stripped to its essentials, 
petitioner's argument amounts to 
saying that he has a constitutional 
right to rely on possible flaws in 
the agent's memory, or to challenge 
the agent's credibility witho~t 
being beset by corrohorating 
evidence that is not susceptible 
of impeachment. For no other 
argument can justify excluding an 
accurate version of a conversation 
that the agent could testify to 
from memory. We think the risk that 
petitioner took in offering a bribe 
to Davis fairly included the risk that 
the offer would be accurately reproduced 
in court, whether by faultless memory 
or mechanical recording." 10 L.Ed.2d 
at 471. 
In allowing evidence of the recorded conversation 
the Court in Lopez reasoned that if the conduct and revela-
tions of an agent operating without electronic equipment do 
not violate a defendant's constitutionally justifiable 
privacy expectations: 
" •• neither does a simultaneous 
recording of the same conversations made 
by th~ agent or by others from trans-
missions received from the agent to whom 
the defendant is talking and whose 
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily 
risks." 28 L.E.2d at 458. 
Given the antecedent case law analyzed in White, the 
plurality opinion harmonized the surviving cases in the 
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eavesdropping area and arrived at several reasonable 
conclusions, which while aiding law enforcement safeguard 
constitutional rights of citizens. These conclusions are: 
(1) as the law does not protect a wrongdoer whose trusted 
accomplice is a police agent, neither should it protect 
him when the same agent records or transmits the 
conversation, which is later offered into evidence; (2) 
having resolved any doubts about an accomplice being an 
informant, a wrongdoer is unlikely to distinguish between 
probable informers on one hand and probable informers 
with transmitters on the other to the extent requiring 
discrete constitutional recognition of those differences; 
(3) the courts should be wary of erecting constitutional 
barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also 
accurate and reliable, recognizing that a defendant who ~s 
no right to exclude an agent's testimony ought not be alloweo 
to exclude a more accurate version of the events; (4) it 
would be untenable to find that while the undercover agent 
without a warrant has acted "reasonably," once he straps oo 
a transmitter his "reasonable" activities are sucldenly 
transformed into an "unreasonable" investigation in violrt~' 
of Fourth Amendment guarantees. 
Respondent asserts that in the instant case a 
reasonable, legal investigation and arrest occurred. 
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Although Kayle Shaw was wired with a transmitter for his own 
protection, it was reasonable, proper and in accord with 
applicable law to admit the tape recording and allow the 
jurors to hear the best evidence of what actually transpired 
in The Gym. 
This position is fully supported by Utah law. The 
privacy section of Utah Code Ann. S 76-9-401 (Supp. 1977), 
provides the following definition: 
" ( 2) 'Eavesdropping' means to 
overhear, record, amplify, or transmit 
any part of a wire or oral communication 
of others without the consent of at 
least one party thereto by means_ of 
any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device." (Emphasis added.) 
This provision certainly provides for and protects the use 
of wired, undercover operatives, and as Kayle Shaw had 
consented to the attachment of the transmitter to his 
person, no violation of Section 76-9-402 occurred. 
Finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-1 (1953), 
as amended, it is doubtful if a search warrant could have 
been issued. Warrants are limited to the seizure of personal 
property and considerable imagination and judicial creativity 
would have to be employed to equate the sound vibrations of 
a person's voice with personal property. 
As noted by appellant, Michigan is a state which 
has decided that a search warrant is requireq in these 
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circumstances. See People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 
N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 878, 46 L.Ed.2d 111. 
However, the Michigan search warrant statute, Mich. 
Compiled Laws 780.652, is unlike the Utah statute in that 
it authorizes the seizure of personal property and "other 
thing[s)." Perhaps because sound waves can be categorized 
as "other thing[s]" they are therefore seizable, but no 
such exception is codified in Utah. While acknowledging 
that this court has the power to provide an individual with 
greater protection under the state constitution than he 
enjoys under the federal constitution, respondent urges this 
Court not to adopt the minority Michigan view. Instead, 
this Court should uphold the admissibility of the tapes. 
Such a decision would acknowledge both the genuine indiv~u~ 
protections of the Fourth Amendrnent and societal protections 
against abandoning the Fourth Amendment to lawbreakers who 
use it primarily to shield themselves from criminal culpa-
bility. In United States v. White, the Court weighed and 
balanced the needs of effective law enforcement against the 
right of a:-i i:-idividual to be frc~e from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Respondent believes that the White analysis is 
correct and appellant's conviction should therefore be 
affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument and current case 
law, respondent urges this court to enter an order affirm-
ing the verdict and judgment of the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSON 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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